Military In Turkish - "Unfortunately, we have not seen satisfactory steps from Sweden on the implementation of the Madrid memorandum," Cavusoglu said. "It is not possible for us to say "yes" to Sweden's NATO bid before we see these steps."
The Swedish government plans to formally decide on March 9 on a long-planned proposal to make it illegal to be part of, or to endorse, a terrorist organization. Stockholm aims for the legislation to enter into force on June 1, although no date has yet been set for a parliamentary vote on the bill.
Military In Turkish
The earthquake did not just shed light on how Erdogan has damaged the state's capacity in the two decades he has been in power; it also revealed where his priorities lie. Like all autocrats, Erdogan faced a trade-off between enriching his family and inner circle and serving the people.
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It is a difficult balance to strike. If an autocrat chooses to please his cronies at the expense of the people, he might face popular protest. If he decides to serve the public by redirecting government spending at his cronies' expense, he might be challenged by the small circle around him.
Incirlik Air Base which houses the United States Air Force, Turkish Air Force and the British Air Force is located in Incirlik which is on the eastern side of Adana, Turkey and 35 miles away from the Mediterranean Sea.
The base employs 5,000 airmen which includes Turkish and British Airmen. The 39th Air Base Wing […] The man who came to power promising to get things done could not deliver on that promise in Turkey's darkest hour because his one-man rule eroded the foundations of governance. Disaster relief is an important part of most modern armies' work.
They can act quickly and provide medical and logistical support after natural disasters. As part of his efforts to curb the generals' power, Erdogan stripped the military of its capacity to respond unprompted to domestic disasters such as earthquakes, establishing AFAD to take on that role instead.
Erdogan's response to the country's devastating earthquake on Feb. 6 was painfully slow and uncoordinated. But regimes in which power is centralized are supposed to be fast and organized. All Erdogan had to do was pick up the phone and order his commanders to dispatch NATO's second-largest army to the badly hit cities, mobilize the bureaucracy to send much-needed aid, and deploy emergency response teams.
He did not. Just minutes after the 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit 10 Turkish provinces, troops stood ready to step in and take part in search and rescue operations. Yet in the critical early hours, the order from the top never came.
Nor did Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) rush to help the victims. Why? Izmir Air Station is 200 miles from Istanbul and located on the western side of Turkey and houses the United States military forces simultaneously when the Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe was activated and the arrival of the Sixth Allied Tac AF on October 1953. The presence of the
United States Air Forces in Europe […] The old idea that autocracies are better than raucous democracies at getting things done found new life during the coronavirus pandemic. Many Western commentators argued that while democracies dithered and debated, autocracies were quick to respond and mobilize their resources.
Sometimes that might be true—but only if you are the right kind of autocracy. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey, it turned out, is not one of them. Reuters, the news and media division of Thomson Reuters, is the world's largest multimedia news provider, reaching billions of people worldwide every day.
Reuters provides business, financial, national and international news to professionals via desktop terminals, the world's media organizations, industry events and directly to consumers. ANKARA, Feb 27 (Reuters) - Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Monday talks with Sweden and Finland over their NATO membership bids would resume on March 9, although he said Sweden had still not fulfilled its obligations under a memorandum signed last year.
Relations between the United States and China seem to be getting frostier by the day. For its part, Washington has made a series of policy choices over the last few years that can be summed up as tough on Beijing, even seeking to contain the rise of the world's second-biggest economy.
Is the Biden administration's China policy too hawkish? And how might that be impacting the world? Jessica Chen Weiss, formerly a senior advisor for policy planning at the State Department under the Biden administration, makes the case that the United States is becoming consumed by competition with China, a strategy that could lead to dangerous conflict.
Is Weiss correct? Join FP's Ravi Agrawal for a frank discussion about the Biden administration's China policy and alternatives that it ought to consider. The organization, like every other state agency in Turkey, quickly became a tool for Erdogan to boost his support at home and abroad.
He stuffed AFAD with incompetent loyalists and made it part of a network of faith-based aid organizations to push the narrative that Erdogan was the "protector of Muslims" around the world. Advertisements showing AFAD providing aid to Muslims in need appear all over pro-government television channels and newspapers, and they are displayed at events in municipalities controlled by Erdogan's Justice and Development Party.
Erdogan may finally pay a price for all of that. Turkey's presidential and parliamentary elections are likely to be held in June. No matter how hard Erdogan-controlled media try to spin things, the sheer scale of the devastation makes it impossible for Erdogan to hide his government's incompetent response.
That will dim his prospects. Pushing the elections back to a later date will not solve his problems, either. The earthquake has compounded Turkey's existing economic, social, and political woes, leaving the country and Erdogan's prospects in a worse place.
Argument: Turkey's Weak Strongman If you use our datasets on your site or blog, we ask that you provide attribution via a link back to this page. We have provided a few examples below that you can copy and paste to your site:
In the last decade, Erdogan consistently chose the former over the latter. His controversial and unorthodox monetary policy to cut interest rates despite spiraling inflation made his already-rich cronies even richer, while runaway food prices and skyrocketing rents squeezed those at the bottom.
Poverty soared as millions of Turks were unable to meet their basic needs. While granting infrastructure and building contracts to cronies who cut corners on safety earned Erdogan's inner circle billions of dollars, the shoddy residences they built turned into graves for tens of thousands of people.
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Erdogan, in his 20 years at the helm, has hollowed out the country's institutions and placed incompetent loyalists in key positions to centralize power in his own hands. This made Erdogan the strongest man in the country but left the state barely functioning.
One of the most striking examples of institutional erosion is Erdogan's suppression of the Turkish military, which went far beyond the legitimate aim of limiting the generals' role in politics. Hungary is the only other NATO member not to have ratified the Nordic countries' applications.
Its parliament is scheduled to start debating the matter this week. Budapest said on Saturday a vote may take place in the second half of March. In a brilliant book, Timothy Frye tells us that strongmen are not as strong as we all think.
Being an autocrat is no easy feat. Autocratic leaders, particularly in personalist autocracies such as Turkey's, face trade-offs. They mobilize support by promising to get things done, but the things they must do to build their one-person rule end up undermining their capacity to deliver on that promise.
One of the first things strongmen do when they centralize power is to weaken institutions. But weak institutions make it difficult for them to govern, which eventually undermines their strongman rule. Erdogan's response to the country's devastating earthquake on Feb.
6 was painfully slow and uncoordinated. But regimes in which power is centralized are supposed to be fast and organized. All Erdogan had to do was pick up the phone and order his commanders to dispatch NATO's second-largest army to the badly hit cities, mobilize the bureaucracy to send much-needed aid, and deploy emergency response teams.
He did not. Just minutes after the 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit 10 Turkish provinces, troops stood ready to step in and take part in search and rescue operations. Yet in the critical early hours, the order from the top never came.
Nor did Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) rush to help the victims. Why? Erdogan's Turkey is a powerful reminder that strongmen do not bring stability and do not get things done. They are at their worst when their country needs them the most.
The tragedy that struck two weeks ago reminds us that Turkey does not need a strongman; it needs strong, capable institutions. The old idea that autocracies are better than raucous democracies at getting things done found new life during the coronavirus pandemic.
Many Western commentators argued that while democracies dithered and debated, autocracies were quick to respond and mobilize their resources. Sometimes that might be true—but only if you are the right kind of autocracy. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey, it turned out, is not one of them.
In a brilliant book, Timothy Frye tells us that strongmen are not as strong as we all think. Being an autocrat is no easy feat. Autocratic leaders, particularly in personalist autocracies such as Turkey's, face trade-offs.
They mobilize support by promising to get things done, but the things they must do to build their one-person rule end up undermining their capacity to deliver on that promise. One of the first things strongmen do when they centralize power is to weaken institutions.
But weak institutions make it difficult for them to govern, which eventually undermines their strongman rule. Is the United States becoming protectionist? Ever since Washington passed its Inflation Reduction Act, which provides subsidies and investment opportunities for clean energy initiatives, a c...Show morehorus of lawmakers in Europe and Asia have begun to say the United States is fostering unfair competition.
Is it? Join FP's Ravi Agrawal for a wide-ranging conversation with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai on the Biden administration's trade and economic policies—and the impacts they have on the world. Subscribers can send in questions in advance.
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